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This article is based upon the text o f an address delivered to a 
forum on “The Role o f the Attorney-General and Minister o f  
Justice” held 17 October 1986 at the University o f New Brunswick, 
Fredericton. The author reviews the conflicting roles o f the 
Attorney-General in his non-prosecutorial capacity and the 
Minister o f Justice with emphasis on the Canadian provincial con­
text. It outlines the balancing o f interests and responsibilities o f a 
cabinet minister bound for some purposes to doctrines o f  
ministerial responsibility and cabinet solidarity, and for other pur­
poses to doctrines o f integrity, independence and quasi-judicial 
decision-making in the administration o f justice. This paper may be 
viewed as a companion piece to the author’s “Police Power and the 
Role o f the Provincial Minister o f Justice” (1979), 27 (#1) Chitty’s 
L.J. 13. G.F.G.
L ’article suivant est fondée sur une présentation faite à un groupe 
d ’étude sur les fonctions: du Procureur Général et du Ministre de la 
Justice le 17 octobre 1986 à l ’Université du Nouveau-Brunswick à 
Fredericton. L ’auteur a discuté les possibilités de conflits fonc- 
tionels du Procureur Général dans ses responsabilités autres que 
Directeur des Poursuites Publiques et comme Ministère de la 
Justice, en ce qui a trait aux responsabilités provinciales au 
Canada. Il discuta du besoin d ’équilibrer les fonctions et les 
responsabilités d ’un ministre et d ’un membre du conseil exécutif 
solidaire avec ses collègues, en matière gouvernmental et en même 
temps le besoin d ’intégrité, d ’indépendence et de qualités quasi- 
judicaires du premier responsable pour l ’administration de la 
justice dans la province. La présentation peut s ’annexer à l ’ouvrage 
déjà publiée sous le titre “Police Power and the Role o f the Provin­
cial Minister o f Justice” (1979), 27 (No. 1) Chitty’s L.J. 13, égale­
ment écrit par M. Gregory.
Throughout the Commonwealth the functions of Attorney-General are vested 
in officeholders with varying degrees of independence from the electoral pro­
cess or from the cabinet. While the Office of Attorney-General in England and 
Wales is the original model, it is now unique among all Commonwealth coun­
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tries in that the office is held by an elected member of the government who 
does not hold a place in cabinet. The other extreme is found in a number of 
jurisdictions where the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial functions are carried 
out by a civil servant, who may or may not be subject to direction.
While the Attorney-General’s office in New Brunswick is not unique, 
what is unusual is the combination of such a wide range of responsibilities in 
the officeholder through his accompanying appointment as Minister of 
Justice. The Executive Council Act of New Brunswick provides that the 
Lieutenant-Governor may appoint from the members of his Council an 
Attorney-General who shall also be Minister of Justice.1 This provision was in­
serted in the Act in 1979. It reversed the 1967 amendment which first introduc­
ed the title and office of Minister of Justice, making that office ex officio and 
giving primacy to the title of Attorney-General. The 1979 amendment 
represented a part of a process attempting to draw attention to the distinction 
between the two offices; other steps in that process included alterations in the 
structure of the department to create separate divisions for carrying out the 
roles of Attorney-General and Minister of Justice and the use of distinctive 
stationery.
Small jurisdictions such as New Brunswick, with a population of 700,000, 
enjoy the complete range of provincial government powers but must attempt 
to exercise them with a population and tax base equivalent to a city of 
moderate size. The result, rightly or wrongly, has been a concentration of 
government functions. The Attorney-General - Minister of Justice and his 
department in New Brunswick are vested with the responsibilities of a number 
of ministers and departments in larger jurisdictions. In Ontario, for example, 
the equivalent roles are carried out by the separate departments of the 
Attorney-General, Solcitor-General, Corrections, Consumer and Commercial 
Relations, Financial Institutions and the young offender functions of Com­
munity and Social Services. These six departments are presided over by four 
different ministers. So that the reader will appreciate this concentration of 
function in the one officeholder in New Brunswick, an organization chart has 
been appended to this paper which outlines the structure of the department 
and the division of responsibilities (Appendix A). The most relevant respon­
sibilities of the attorney and minister have been delineated in greater detail in 
Appendix B; the scope of the fields of policy and administration assigned to 
the two offices by custom as well as by legislation or cabinet assignment have 
been identified. In addition, lists of the statutes that the attorney and minister 
are required to administer have been provided in Appendix C. To place this in 
context, of the 384 public statutes of the province, the Attorney-General is 
responsible for the content and administration of seventy-one, and the 
Minister of Justice is obliged to attend to seventy-five. As a result, one cabinet 
minister is responsible for just under forty percent of all legislation ad­
ministered by government.
The imposition of such a broad range of responsibilites on the Attorney- 
General in this province is a relatively recent phenomenon, although he has
1Executive Council Act, S.N.B. 1979, c. 19.
always had the complete field of criminal justice and civil legal matters. The 
abolition of county government in the late 1960s and other influences have 
resulted in a growth of the legal burdens such that the department's legal staff 
has been increased from five to about ninety, representing ten percent of the 
practising lawyers in this province. The Attorney-General’s department 
employs ten percent of the regular civil service and in numbers is the third 
largest department of government.
It should be noted that New Brunswick is not alone in vesting many func­
tions in the hands of the Attorney-General - Minister of Justice. On the other 
hand, larger jurisdictions in this country are consistently moving to an assign­
ment of the non-Attorney-General functions to another minister and depart­
ment; the federal government, Alberta, Ontario and most recently Quebec 
have effected such a division since the 1960s.
While disaffection with the combination in one officeholder of the roles 
of Attorney-General and Minister of Justice does not appear widespread in 
this jurisdiction, there have been suggestions that it is timely to conduct a reap­
praisal of the office. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the 
scope of the responsibilities of these two offices in those fields not encompass­
ed by his duties of criminal prosecutions and his relationship to the judiciary. 
While the emphasis is upon these offices in the context of the Province of New 
Brunswick, many aspects will be relevant to other Canadian jurisdictions that 
have combined a wide range of responsibilities. The essence of this exercise is 
not a mere identification of responsibilities, but an appreciation of the conse­
quences upon our perception of the Office of Attorney-General that flow from 
the combination of responsibilities in one officeholder. Some of the results of 
combining many responsibilities are undoubtedly positive; some are not. It is 
surely a matter of individual judgment to assess the relative importance of 
these positive and negative results. We should assess whether this consolida­
tion of functions justifies our expectations, or our fears, and the extent to 
which they have been realized in tangible benefits or real challenges to 
credibility and public confidence.
Distinctions Between the Offices
At the outset two basic propositions can be identified. First, the Office of 
Attorney-General is the more permanent role embodying customary legal 
responsibilities as the state’s prosecutor and the state’s lawyer. It is an office 
with more than two hundred years of history, one of the original offices of the 
colony and province. The duties of the Minister of Justice, on the other hand, 
while equally important in such fields as ensuring effective policing, are assign­
ed by statute or executive act and most are of relatively recent origin. As such, 
the Minister of Justice could readily be divested of some or all of these respon­
sibilities by reassignment to other members of the cabinet, or to a new port­
folio — a Home Secretary as in England, or a Solicitor-General as at the 
federal level in Canada. Centuries of custom do not permit us, as a practical 
matter, to contemplate a similar reassignment of portions of the legal role of 
the Attorney-General. Hence, the scope of the Attorney-General’s role is 
largely unalterable. This, however, is not to suggest that the role could not be
assigned to an individual who is not a member of cabinet, or even a non­
elected official. Secondly, public confidence in the integrity of the Attorney- 
General and his decisions is a fundamental necessity; a higher standard must 
be met than is demanded of the Minister of Justice. The aspect of the 
Attorney-General’s role that is most sensitive is undoubtedly found in the pro­
secutions field, but his role as legal advisor and counsel to government in non­
criminal and legislative matters can also affect public confidence if not proper­
ly discharged. This role is all the more sensitive, in part because his powers and 
discretions are considerable but also because he alone is responsible to carry 
them out. The exercise of the Attorney-General’s discretionary powers cannot 
be directed by government colleagues; he is not subject to majority cabinet rule 
or cabinet solidarity. Sole authority, therefore, in the exercise of his discre­
tionary powers engenders a requirement of public confidence in the propriety 
of those decisions.
If public confidence can be shaken by prosecutorial decisions of doubtful 
motivation, can we reasonably expect the public to be indifferent to the man­
ner in which the Attorney-General discharges his other legal obligations? 
Similarly, can he expect to maintain public confidence if, wearing his other hat 
as Minister of Justice, legitimate questions of propriety arise as to the manner 
in which he has carried out those functions, particularly, but not exclusively, 
in the administration of the coroner system, sheriffs, policing or corrections? 
Integrity and the appearance of integrity is required of all government func­
tions and all members of cabinet. The Minister of Justice is a cabinet member 
like all others, save the Attorney-General. His decisions are expected to take 
into account their political results. In this context, the word “ political” may 
refer to public interest or, within reason, to party political considerations. 
Checks and balances are present: the judiciary may review the results of his ad­
ministration; the police have a public role in carrying out their investigative 
functions and he has no authority, legislated or otherwise, to intervene in their 
investigations; his decisions must have the support of the rest of the govern­
ment and may be reversed without that support. This is in sharp contrast with 
the Attorney-General whose decisions in that office are historically not 
reviewable or reversible by the judiciary, the police or cabinet. Hence, my se­
cond proposition that it is essential that the Attorney-General enjoy public 
confidence in the manner in which he wields absolute authority within the 
bounds of his legal duties as well as his prosecutorial responsibilities.
There are certain standards of conduct that I believe must be present if 
that essential public confidence in the Attorney-General is to be achieved. 
These standards include the following:
— The Attorney-General must constantly realize that we depend 
upon the integrity of the individual who holds the Office of 
Attorney-General.
— The Attorney-General must be responsible and accountable for 
the exercise of his powers, whether carried out personally or by 
agents (prosecutors and solicitors) in his name. Furthermore, that 
obligation of accountability, if not owed to the executive branch
of government or to the judiciary must be owed to the legislature 
or parliament.
— The Attorney-General should refrain from excessive partisan 
political activity or speech.
— The Attorney-General must provide sufficient information to the 
public and to the legislature or his opposite number in opposition 
so that confidence will be maintained in his motives and his ac­
tions.
— The Attorney-General must conduct his personal affairs and his 
other duties as Minister of Justice in such a manner that his in­
tegrity in fulfilling the Attorney-General function will not be 
suspect.
An examination of the last of these standards — that is, the nature of the non­
prosecution duties of the Attorney-General and the duties of the Minister of 
Justice — may aid in addressing current questions. Should the Attorney- 
General be an elected member of a political party? Should the Attorney- 
General be a member of the government and of cabinet? Should the individual 
occupying the Office of Attorney-General also be vested with the duties impos­
ed on the office of Minister of Justice? These are the considerations to which I 
now turn.
Attorney-General as Legal Advisor to Government
The Attorney-General’s role as legal advisor to government is assigned by 
custom and by executive direction. He acts as the government’s lawyer. This 
role includes rendering advice, and making representations before courts and 
tribunals for departments of government and related agencies, such as school 
boards. In this regard there exists a solicitor-client relationship and the 
Attorney-General’s role is to provide non-binding advice; he takes instructions 
on his clients’ cases as would any lawyer.
On occasion the Attorney-General will encounter a situation in which he, 
in good conscience, cannot participate as counsel to a government department 
or agency. This is not a common situation but it does arise from time to time. 
Engaging private counsel on behalf of the client department is a possible solu­
tion. On other occasions, he may simply refuse to act. In a recent example of 
this, the Attorney-General consistently provided counsel in licensing pro­
ceedings before a board established pursuant to provincial legislation. 
However, when the board acquired enforcement staff the Attorney-General 
advised that, in his opinion, standards of natural justice were being violated 
and he would not participate in any further proceedings. This difficulty was 
eventually overcome by an amendment to the board’s legislation removing the 
basis for an objection on grounds of natural justice.
It is not difficult to find an example of one of many inherent conflicts that 
must be resolved in carrying out the role of legal advisor. The Attorney- 
General will provide advice and assistance, through one of his solicitors, to a 
minister of another department. The Attorney-General will then be obliged to
advise the entire cabinet through the Clerk of the Executive Council, and quite 
independently, by another of his solicitors, on exactly the same subject matter. 
Not infrequently the legal advice is contradictory because the clients’ interests 
are different. One client is an individual minister and department; the other 
client is the government as a whole. Such conflicts are usually resolved without 
great difficulty when the Attorney-General provides his personal opinion to 
cabinet on the proper course for the government as a whole.
A related duty requires the Attorney-General to prepare all draft legisla­
tion and regulations. Once again this is in the nature of legal advice and 
assistance to client ministers and departments. His opinion on the constitu­
tional validity of the legislative proposals is given and usually accepted, 
although this is not always the case. The client department and minister may 
elect to reject his advice and proceed with legislation despite the Attorney- 
General’s view of constitutional invalidity. This is so whether the constitu­
tional issue is one of federal-provincial division of powers, or a potential viola­
tion of the new standards of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms.1 
Since the implementation of the Charter for example, a legislative proposal 
was characterized by the Attorney-General as offensive to the right of freedom 
of association in section 2. The government received the advice, processed the 
bill anyway, and it was subsequently enacted by the Legislature. In another ex­
ample, regulations which probably offend the language provisions of the 
Charter have been approved by cabinet. Here the Attorney-General pointed 
out the constitutional problem but acknowledged that no other practical 
course existed due to the volume of translation required.
The Attorney-General also has a role in civil issues before the courts, in 
which he acts not as counsel to government but fulfills his own independent 
role as what is sometimes referred to as “guardian of the public interest” . In 
that capacity he may apply, and is ordinarily extended the right, to intervene 
ex officio in private litigation where a public interest issue is apparent. This 
would normally be expected to arise where the interests of the public or the 
government are unlikely to be adequately argued before the court because of 
the limited interests of the private litigants. A more limited appearance by the 
Attorney-General in private litigation is found in his application to make 
representations to the court as amicus curiae or “ friend of the court” . Here his 
appearance is not as a party to the litigation, as is the case in an intervention, 
but solely to present argument or to raise points of law in an effort to ensure 
that the court has received a more complete argument on a particular issue. It 
is conceivable, although perhaps highly unlikely, that such an intervention or 
appearance as amicus curiae could arise in a case in which the government or 
one of its agencies is one of the parties, and further that his intervention would 
be adverse. Participation in litigation independent of government also occurs 
when the Attorney-General agrees to lend his name in an ex relator action 
taken by a private litigant who advances a case to restrain a general or public 
wrong. The same objective could be accomplished by an application by the 
Attorney-General ex officio to obtain an injunction restraining a continued 
violation of the law. Both procedures are based on his obligation to enforce
2Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
the law and represent an alternative to a prosecution.
I will conclude this brief description of the Attorney-General’s non- 
prosecutorial legal role with reference to three further instances of the exercise 
of discretion independent of the government. The first arises in the legislated 
requirement that the Attorney-General’s fiat be obtained prior to a private 
litigant advancing an application for an injunction to abate a nuisance 
emanating from an industrial activity. In one case the fiat was refused in spite 
of obvious air pollution from an industrial plant, due to the 
Attorney-General’s judgment of the extent of the economic consequences if 
the injunction was obtained. Prior to reaching that conclusion, the Attorney- 
General sought the views of the Minister of Economic Growth who emphasis­
ed the adverse economic consequences of such an injunction. In another case, 
noxious fumes from farming operations have twice resulted in granting the fiat 
in the last two years in spite of the objections of the minister and department 
of another branch of government. In all such cases the Attorney-General con­
sults within the government, but reaches his own conclusion on the proper 
course. Finally, the Attorney-General provides a form of public interest 
representation in hearings before the appropriate tribunal determining utility 
rates. The representations, by counsel retained by the Attorney-General as 
“ the public intervenor” , are independent of any provincial government in­
terest of instruction and are based solely on an assessment of the public in­
terest.
Responsibilities of the Minister of Justice
The duties imposed on the Minister of Justice may be conveniently divided in­
to two categories. Significant duties relate to the field of criminal justice. The 
other wide area consists of a mixture of legislated assignments primarily falling 
under the heads of consumer affairs and corporate administration, including 
financial institutions.
The involvement of the Minister of Justice in criminal justice spans the 
operation of a highway traffic police force (New Brunswick Highway Patrol), 
contractual relations with the provincial police force (Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police) (whose services are purchased from the government of 
Canada), liaison with the provincial police commission, support and policy 
direction to police agencies and all other aspects of the government’s respon­
sibility to ensure that citizens in all parts of the province enjoy a reasonable 
standard of police protection and service. Specifically, the minister is concern­
ed with: ineffective police agencies, police misconduct, financial support for 
more advanced police techniques and activities, the development of regional 
police agencies, the promotion of good relations and cooperative enforcement 
efforts among police agencies, determining the appropriate responsibility in 
terms of subject matter and geography for a number of police agencies created 
by the federal, provincial and municipal governments.
Most of the activity of the Minister of Justice and his department in the 
policing field is intended to fulfill a provincial government’s constitutionally 
assigned responsiblity to police its territory. This is done largely by advice,
funding, moral suasion and other techniques common when several institu­
tions share a portion of the burden of such subject matter. Legislated assign­
ment of the minister’s role in the police field or the imposition of standards 
was totally absent until ten years ago. The Police Act of 1977 attempts to fill 
this void and distributes duties to municipal government and to the Minister of 
Justice, and assigns a portion of his former role to the provincial police com­
mission.3
The mode of operation regarding specific police investigations or prosecu­
tions is to draw a line at that point where the Attorney-General’s role should 
legitimately commence. Consequently, the Minister of Justice and that branch 
of his department working with the police community refrain from any in­
volvement in particular cases. Their activity is confined to providing support 
and advice for the police agency as an institution and not with assistance or 
direction in individual investigations. The only exception would be the 
response to a request for assistance in manpower or expertise initiated by the 
police department attempting to cope with a case. The Attorney-General and 
his prosecutors conduct all relations with the police when specific cases are 
underway, both before and after the laying of a charge.
The distinction between a particular investigation and policy direction to 
police agencies is just one example of the sensitivity that must be employed by 
the individual who occupies the two cabinet roles and the officers in the Office 
of the Attorney-General and in the Department of Justice. When dealing with 
potential charges the role of Minister of Justice with respect to policing con­
siderations, always gives way to that of the Attorney-General. In practical 
terms, the Director of Policing Services must be instructed and must unders­
tand that he is not to enter upon the exercise of functions of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. The assistance and advice of the former to police agen­
cies is general and may be applicable to a category of investigations; for exam­
ple, clarifying the territorial limits of a municipal police officer’s authority. 
But where that same question arises in an investigation, after the police officer 
has taken action, the assessment of its legality and the effect upon a prosecu­
tion become the business of the prosecutor.
It seems a natural consequence of the combination of roles in one cabinet 
minister that his views and expressions of policy will carry great weight with 
the police community — the more so if, as is often the case, individual heads 
of police agencies and police officers fail to fully appreciate the distinction in 
roles and which ministerial office they are encountering from time to time. 
Thus the view of the Attorney-General on whether a charge should be laid or 
not appears to the investigating police officer to emanate from the same 
minister who influences support services or funding to police agencies, i.e. the 
Minister of Justice. As a result, the Attorney-General’s view on whether a 
charge should be laid probably becomes more influential. For example, the 
Attorney-General has issued a policy regarding drinking and driving offences 
that the case should not go forward until the police department furnishes a 
transcript of the offender’s driving record, so as to detect previous offences 
and give the necessary notice that a higher penalty will be sought. This policy,
which has no force of law, is probably given greater weight because the 
Attorney-General’s function is combined with that of Minister of Justice, and 
the latter can provide considerable benefits to the police department.
The combination of roles also permits the opportunity for mounting an 
effective and broad effort to combat a particular category of offence. The 
drinking and driving example is apt. Not only will the police community be 
more responsive to increased emphasis on this type of offence, but also fewer 
bureaucratic impediments will arise if the policy can be implemented by one 
minister responsible for policing, prosecutions, courts and corrections. 
Whether this facility in attacking a problem such as drinking and driving 
justifies the concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of one 
minister is a point worth discussing. We should not underestimate the effec­
tiveness of concentrating such responsibility, or of the obstructive effect of 
dividing it in an overlapping fashion among two or more departments.
To illustrate the tangle of relationships that arise from the combination of 
roles inherent in the two offices we could examine a coroner’s inquest into a 
highway accident resulting in death. The accident will be investigated by the 
New Brunswick Highway Patrol, a province-wide police agency which is the 
responsibility of the Minister of Justice. If that investigation results in the 
police conclusion that a charge of criminal negligence should be preferred, the 
potential charge will not ordinarily go forward if the Crown prosecutor, the 
agent of the Attorney-General, determines that there is insufficient admissible 
evidence. Due to the fact that a fatality has occurred, that matter is also within 
a coroner’s purview and the latter will receive the information and advice of 
the police and the prosecutor in determining whether or not a public inquest 
should be held. Here the prosecutor’s role changes to the extent that he 
becomes an advisor to the coroner. The prosecutor has no determinative role 
and assists in presenting the circumstances to the coroner and jury in accor­
dance with the wishes and instructions of the coroner. The potential for a con­
fusion of roles is increased due to the fact that the operation of the coroner 
system is the responsibility of the Minister of Justice, and that the coroner is 
also a sheriff, and as such a full-time employee of the Justice Department. 
This example of a highway fatality could raise even more apprehensions if we 
add the further circumstance that a primary cause of the fatal accident was the 
failure of adequate highway maintenance by another department of the same 
government, and that the minister of that department may be embarrassed if 
the coroner’s inquest proceeds. It is also conceivable that suspicions will arise 
in the minds of family members interested in a prosecution or, failing that, in a 
coroner’s inquest if their objectives are frustrated. This is especially the case 
when they are not exposed to all of the information and considerations found 
in the files of the various official participants. This information is rarely made 
public in any meaningful way. As such it is hardly necessary to state that great 
care must be taken by all participants to ensure that their decisions are proper­
ly motivated and will bear scrutiny; that is, decisions must be taken with a pro­
per appreciation of the role in which the individuals are acting.
The duties of the Minister of Justice which lie outside the criminal justice 
field would seem to cause no inherent conflict in responsibilities, either with
the policing, court, or corrections duties of that minister, or with the duties of 
the Attorney-General. The administration of legislation relating to the land 
registry system, consumer protection, the insurance industry or the 
cooperative and credit union movement are quite detached. Nevertheless, we 
can await with some trepidation a situation of maladministration in one of 
these areas, particularly failed attempts to ensure the financial stability of in­
surance and trust companies or credit unions. Significant public losses fre­
quently give rise to demands for retribution through prosecutions, and the 
Attorney-General’s refusal to prosecute could be interpreted as a reluctance to 
take steps which would disclose shortcomings in carrying out his supervision 
of these companies as Minister of Justice.
Conclusion
It is clear that there are problems inherent in combining the roles of the two 
ministers. The major problem lies in our perception of the Attorney-General 
and our confidence that his quasi-judicial decisions related to the criminal 
court process are accompanied by the proper degree of objectivity and integri­
ty. But we should also be concerned with perceptions of his civil law roles re­
quiring an equal degree of independence. It is unlikely that the Attorney- 
General’s role as “ guardian of the public interest” will flourish or continue to 
be accepted by the judiciary if there is no consensus that he can and does carry 
out his duties without regard for effect on party political interests, on the in­
terests of his cabinet colleagues, and also the effect on his other responsibilities 
as Minister of Justice.
We should also be aware of the possibilities that officeholders or 
employees, such as prosecutors, acting in the name of the Attorney-General 
may receive inadequate instruction on their obligations or fail to appreciate 
fully the nature of their role as agents of the Attorney-General. This is an im­
portant consideration since sheer volume dictates that on many occasions these 
powers are not carried out by the Attorney-General personally, yet he remains 
responsible and accountable for them. Similar considerations apply to 
employees of the Minister of Justice. Another danger in the same vein can be 
found in the extension of a misplaced compassion by the civil or criminal legal 
staff for other bureaucrats in the government, especially those functioning in 
the Minister of Justice’s fields of responsibility. Advice that is motivated in 
any degree by a desire to refrain from revealing the defaults of other 
bureaucrats or by an accommodation of the political or policy objectives of 
other ministries will impair our confidence in the exercise of the Attorney- 
General’s role if that advice is supposed to be based on the merits of the situa­
tion in the assessment of the Attorney-General alone.
In addition we cannot discount the prevailing attitude of the media and of 
large segments of the community in suspecting the exercise of power by those 
in government. Again, in my view, these suspicions are frequently contributed 
to by a lack of information. Those on the inside of the wall that surrounds the 
Attorney-General may be comfortable in the correctness of their actions, but 
those on the outside who lack information and participation are seldom so 
comfortable. The public is forced, reluctantly, to rely upon integrity with little
information by which to assess its presence or absence. The climate of scep­
ticism concerning the capacity of a mere mortal who occupies the office of 
Attorney-General is healthy in moderate degree, but destructive when carried 
to excess. Mistrust of authority and of those institutions vested with the power 
to make decisions is a significant factor in assessing the proper route to take on 
the questions addressed herein.
Change in the role or character of the offices of Attorney-General and 
Minister of Justice merely for the sake of change is not useful. An office that 
has evolved and exercised a concept of independence of action over centuries 
should not be altered lightly unless we are satisfied that change will represent 
an improvement. I would allude to alterations in the prosecutorial relationship 
of the Attorney-General and the police in England and Wales as an example. 
In that jurisdiction the police have traditionally controlled the decision to pro­
secute in the vast majority of cases, even to the extent of engaging and instruc­
ting the lawyer who will prosecute. This system has been the subject of 
repeated study in the last few decades, and repeated urging that apprehensions 
of police abuses should be corrected by a country-wide prosecutions system 
representing the Attorney-General and enjoying greater control over the deci­
sion to initiate charges. Such a change and shift in power is now being im­
plemented. This example is raised merely to make the point that one may con­
clude that it is inevitable that the repository of the power will be the object of 
mistrust. That mistrust will not abate by reassigning power; we may succeed 
only in reassigning the focus of that mistrust.
What of the advantages of the status quo? I have alluded briefly to some, 
but the list must include a concern, in a small jurisdiction, for the size of 
government and the cost of divesting the Attorney-General and his department 
of the functions of the Minister of Justice. Nevertheless, I would assign 
relatively minor importance to such considerations. Maintenance of the status 
quo also preserves an assignment of responsibility for the complete range of 
legal requirements of government, and the criminal justice system, in one 
minister; this is traditional in this jurisdiction, and, until recently, common in 
Canada. I have already alluded to the move by large jurisdictions in this coun­
try to a separation of responsibilities. Further, the most positive result of a 
concentration of responsibilities is found in the efficiency and effectiveness 
that can be achieved in developing programs and policies to confront impor­
tant social and law enforcement problems. Government efforts to deal with 
drinking and driving, police effectiveness in illicit drug trafficking, family 
violence and similar social problems, are greatly enhanced by a unification of 
the government’s response in the hands of one minister and department. Those 
responses become more decisive and are free of the customary difficulties of 
ministerial and departmental contests over role.
On the other side of the scales is the fundamental necessity of maintaining 
public confidence in the objectivity of the Attorney-General’s actions. Can 
such a concentration of responsibilities, the frequent involvement in conten­
tious issues and the prevailing climate of scepticism of the exercise of govern­
mental authority subsist with public confidence in the Attorney-General? Can 
we reasonably expect an acceptance of the apolitical motivation of the
Attorney-General when we require that the same person exercise political judg­
ment and be subject to cabinet solidarity in his other functions as Minister of 
Justice? Is the problem one of structure, or of current attitudes toward power? 
Would we improve the situation by a freer flow of information, by greater 
candour in explaining the reasons behind the decisions? My own view, and 
probably that of most employees of the Department of Justice, is to favour 
any step that would reduce suspicion. The opinions of bureaucrats, of course, 
do not prevail. In some instances those views are self-serving, to the extent that 
each seeks to carry out his own particular function unencumbered by the pro­
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STATUTES OF NEW BRUNSWICK UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL
ATTORNEY-GENERAL DIVISION
Age of Majority 
Arbitration 
Attorney-General
Charter Compliance Acts 
Contributory Negligence 




















International Child Abduction 








Proceedings Against the Crown 
Property
Protection of Persons Acting Under Statute 
Public Records
Queen’s Counsel and Precedence
Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders 198S 
Regulations:
Respecting Compliance of the Laws of the 
Province with the Canadian Charter 
o f Rights and Freedoms, 1986 
Respecting the Removal of Archaic Terminology 
from the Acts of New Brunswick
Statute of Frauds 
Statute Law Amendments 
Summary Convictions 
Survival of Actions 
Survivorship





Compensation for Victims of Crime 
Coroners 
Corrections 
Custody and Detention of Young Persons
Intoxicated Persons Detention
Liens on Goods and Chattels
Memorials and Executions
Parole
Police (Parts I, II and III)
Private Investigators and Security Services
Sale of Lands Publication 
Salvage Dealers Licensing 
Sheriffs
Training School
Wage-Earners Protection (Sheriffs Office) 
Woodsmen’s Lien
STATUTES OF NEW BRUNSWICK UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF 




Arrest and Examinations 
Assignment of Book Debts 
Assignment and Preferences 
Auctioneers Licence









Consumer Product Warranty and Liability 
Controverted Elections (Registrar of Court) 
Co-operative Associations 
Corporations 
Corrupt Practices Inquiries 









Factors and Agents 
















Merger of Supreme and County Courts 
of New Brunswick 
Partnership 
Partnerships and Business Names Registration 
Pension Fund Societies 
Postal Services Interruption 
Pre-arranged Funeral Services 
Premium Tax (Supt. of Insurance) 




Real Estate Agents 
Real Property Transfer Tax 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments 
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgements in Civil and Common Matters...An Act 
Respecting the Convention Between Canada and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and Providing for the... . 
Recording of Evidence by Sound Recording Machine 
Regional Savings and Loan Societies 
Regional Savings and Loan Societies Federation 
Registry 
Residential Tenancies
Sale of Goods 
Security Frauds Prevention 
(upon proclamation of amendments) 
Standard Forms of Conveyances 
Surety Bonds
Trust, Building and Loan Companies Licensing 
Trust Companies 
Trustees
Unconscionable Transactions Relief
Warehouseman’s Lien 
Warehouse Receipts 
Winding-up
